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Abstract 
 
Though RBAC has been researched for many years as a current dominant access control 
technology, there are few researches to be done to address the further extension of the 
role which is the fundamental entity of RBAC. This paper tries to extend the role to a 
further level, the role attributes. Through the attributes, the function and operation on the 
role can be enhanced and extended. Through the attributes, ANSI RBAC is significantly 
extended. In the inheritance of hierarchical role, the privacy of its parental role can be 
kept by using HA (Hidden Attribute). 
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1 Introduction 
After the Internet becomes one of most important infrastructures for modern societies, all 
systems have to have an access control policy in order to effectively protect the system 
security and privacy. There are a lot of access control technologies in the history. So far it 
is obvious that RBAC has become a domain access control technology. RBAC model is 
mainly based on the different roles which are assigned authorized permissions. Then the 
users use the system through obtaining needed roles. The fundamental entity of RBAC is 
the role. For many years, few researches have been done to further extend the role into a 
further step. This paper tries to expand the role into a next deep level, role attributes.  The 
impact of the attributes on RBAC is thoroughly discussed in later sections.  
 
This paper is organised as the follows: Section 2 introduces basic concepts of ANSI 
RBAC and its components. In Section 3, some research attempts towards the attributes 
are discussed although there are not many. In section 4, a further expansion of the role 
attributes is discussed, including the fundamental concepts, attribute operation, attribute 
types, basic attribute modelling. In Section 5, the basic relationships between the 
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attributes and all entities of ANSI RBAC are discussed. In Section 6, relationship 
comparisons between attributed-extended RBAC and ANSI RBAC from the perspectives 
of the core RBAC, hierarchical RBAC and constrained RBAC are briefly illustrated. In 
Section 7, a new diagram of attribute-extended RBAC is demonstrated. Section 8 
addresses the conclusion remarks and future works.  
 
2 RBAC 
In February 2004, ANSI INCITS 359-2004 [ANSI, 2004] was approved. It is a milestone 
for RBAC research and development. It has a significant impact on the access control. So 
far RBAC has been accepted as a primary technology for system access control. It is a 
result of co-efforts by both academia and industry.  
 
2.1 In Academia 
From 1995 to present, there are 10 ACM symposiums held on Access Control Models 
and Technologies. Most scholarly papers published at the symposiums are more or less 
related to RBAC. If any search is done on ACM or IEEE digital libraries for RBAC, there 
will bring hundreds of papers which are relevant to RBAC.  The fundamental concepts of 
RBAC were addressed by Sandhu, et al [1996]. In [Sandhu, 1996], RBAC was 
categorized as four sub-components, RBAC0, RBAC1, RBAC2, and RBAC3.  
 
RBAC0 is base model of RBAC. In ANSI INCIT 359-2004, RBAC0 is called Core 
RBAC. Core RBAC has four fundamental entities: Users (U), Permissions (P), Sessions 
(S), and Roles (R). Users are human beings or their agents who have ability to use 
information systems. Roles are duties and responsibilities in an organisation or a system. 
Permissions are concerning access to roles with suitable users. Sessions are responsible 
for establishing dynamical relationships between users and roles. The set of relationships 
of U, P, S, and R is defined at Core RBAC as U×R, P×R, S→U, and S→Set(R). U×R 
means the relationship mapping between users and roles. P×R means the relationship 
mapping between permissions and roles. S→U means that a specific user gets a required 
session or sessions. S→Set(R) means that a session is associated with a set of roles.  
 
RBAC1 is defined as role hierarchies. In ANSI INCIT 359-2004, RBAC1 is called 
Hierarchical RBAC. Hierarchical RBAC is actually defined the relationships among 
different roles, especially role inheritance. The main purpose of hierarchical RBAC is to 
simplify the system administration and management.  
 
RBAC2 is defined as Constraints Model. In ANSI INCIT 359-2004, RBAC2 is called 
Constrained RBAC. Constrained RBAC actually puts constrains on users what roles and 
permissions can be assignment to. It can prevent some users from abusing the system. 
Furthermore static constraint and dynamic constraint are introduced by Ferraiolo, et al 
[2001].  
 
RBAC3 is actually a combination of RBAC1 and RBAC2. It has not been listed as a 
separate component in ANSI INCIT 359-2004. 
 
2.2In Industry 
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Many popular operating systems, like, Windows, Linux, Unix, are widely using roles to 
manage system resources. Major DBMS products, like Oracle, Sybase, etc, all support 
RBAC. Major enterprise integration solutions, like SAP, PeopleSoft, widely use the 
concept and mechanism of roles which have the similar functions as being defined in 
RBAC.  
 
3 Related Works 
The most fundamental concept of RBAC is the role. The role decides the security 
properties of information systems. It is important to do further research on the role. So far 
there are some further researches on the role, like environment role [Covington et al, 
2003], parameterized role [Giuri and Iglio, 1997], and attributed role [Byun et al, 2005].  
 
In [Covington et al, 2003], the environment role is defined as a role which is use to 
capture environmental conditions. The environment role has extended the traditional 
RBAC with a new type of role. When the users get their roles, they have to get support 
from relevant environment roles so that they can successfully execute their assigned 
roles. In [5], a role is associated with a template. A role template is represented as 
follows: 
 
r(χ1, χ2, χ3, χ4, χ5,… χn) 
 
Where r is the role name and χ1, χ2, χ3, χ4, χ5, … χn are properties bound to the role, also 
called parameters of the role. In [Byun et al, 2005], the role attributes are defined, the 
notion of role attributes is very similar to the role parameters [Giuri and Iglio, 1997].  
Unfortunately none of further research has been done to extend role attributes into 
RBAC. We are realising that the role attributes can be used to rebuild RBAC and to 
further enhance the central concept of the role. In the following sections, we will address 
the role attribute in details. The role attributes will have a big impact to current RBAC 
mechanism. Also the individual role’s privacy can also be protected by an effective 
implementation of role attributes.    
 
4 Attributes  
A role consists of various attributes which demonstrate the property of the role and the 
permissions the role holds. In order to clearly descript how the role attributes to have the 
impacts on current RBAC mechanism, we need a further discussion on the role attributes 
as follows. 
 
 4.1 Definition of Attribute 
Definition 1 (Attribute) An attribute (Attr) is a property of a role (r). A set of relevant 
attributes consists of a role. A role has a fix set of attributes. The relationships between 
the role and the attribute are presented as follows: 
r(Attr)= r(Attr0, Attr1, …, Attrn) 
∀Attri, Attrj ∈r, ni ≤≤0 , nj ≤≤0 : if ji ≠ , then Φ=∩ ji AttrAttr  
)(
0
AttrrAttri
n
i
=
=
U  
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If a system has a set of roles, R, R=R(r0, r1,  r2, …, rm),  and ATTR is as a full set of 
attributes for the system, we will have the following relationship: 
 
)(...)()( 10 AttrrAttrrAttrrATTR mUUU=  
 
In order to use the role attributes to implement access control, we need to define more 
concepts to support this mechanism. 
 
 4.2 Attributes types 
As the attributes are properties of a role, we define four types of attributes: compulsory, 
optional, obvious, and hidden. 
 
4.2.1 Compulsory  
Definition 2 (Compulsory Attribute (CA)) A compulsory attribute is an essential part of a 
role. If a compulsory attribute of a role is deactivated or a compulsory attribute has an 
empty value, the role cannot be assigned to any user and the role is also in a non-active 
situation.  
 
∀  Attrk ∈ATTR, zk ≤≤0 , z is the cardinality of ATTR 
  If r  of CAa  is Attr and r(Attr)Attr kk ∈  
Then )(Attrk Attrr↔  
 
 
4.2.2 Optional 
Definition 3 (Optional Attribute (OA)) An optional attribute is not an essential part of a 
role. If an OA of a role is deactivated or an OA has an empty value, the role can still be 
assigned to the users for a normal execution.  
 
∀  Attrk ∈ATTR, zk ≤≤0 , z is the cardinality of ATTR 
  If r  of OA an is Attr and r(Attr)Attr kk ∈  
Then  )(Attrk Attrra
 
4.2.3 Obvious  
Definition 4 (Obvious Attribute (ObA)) An obvious attribute of a role is visible to all 
other roles which have relationships with this role. ObA can be useful in the hierarchical 
RBAC and constraint RBAC.  ObA can be formulized as the follows: 
 
∀  Attrk ∈ATTR, zk ≤≤0 , z is the cardinality of ATTR 
  If and  r of ObA an is Attr and (Attr)rAttr ikik ∈
If ji ≠Φ≠ &rx  r  ji Then is visible to rkAttr j
 
 
4.2.4 Hidden 
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Definition 5 (Hidden Attribute (HA)) A hidden attribute of a role is only visible to the 
role itself. It can be expressed as follows: 
∀  Attrk ∈ATTR, zk ≤≤0 , z is the cardinality of ATTR 
  If and  r of ObA an is Attr and (Attr)rAttr ikik ∈
If ji =Φ≠ &rx  r  ji Then is visible to rkAttr j 
                                              Other is never visible to rkAttr j
 
 
4.2.5 Role conformation 
Based on four role types, a role can be formed by only CA or CA as well as OA. Any CA 
can be ObA or HA. Any OA can also be ObA or HA. The role formation is shown at 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Role conformation 
r 
r(CA) 
r(CA,OA) 
r(ObA or HA) 
r(ObA or HA, ObA or HA) 
 
 
4.2.6 Usage of role types 
We use a university hierarchy, shown in Figure 2, to demonstrate the usage of CA and 
OA. In Figure 2, we have the following roles: university role, department role, academics 
role, administration role, research role, teaching role, etc. At the top of the hierarchy, the 
university role has the attributes: University ID, students, faculty, company management. 
It is clear that the attributes of University ID, students and faculty are CA. If the 
university has no university ID, students, faculty members, there is no way to have the 
university. There is an attribute of university called Company which means the university 
has a function to manage a company. It is clear that Company can be an OA because if 
the university does not have a function to run a company, the university can still be called 
“university”. All other attributes displayed in Figure 2 are obviously CA. Of course here 
we can add some OA for all the roles for the extra duties or functions.  
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   IS Department 
Department ID 
IS Students 
IS Faculty Academic ID 
Academic Students
Academic Faculty 
Figure 2 A part of a university hierarchy 
   University 
CS Department     Business School  
Academics  Academics  Administration Administration 
Research Teaching  
Uni ID 
Students 
Faculty 
Company 
Teaching ID 
Course Students 
Course Lecturer 
 
 
We use a part of a college leadership hierarchy [Figure 3] to demonstrate the usage of 
ObA and HA. In Figure 3, there are different roles in a college, Dean, Head of 
Department, Research leader, Teaching leader, project researcher, course lecturer, etc. 
The Course lecturer at the bottom of the hierarchy has the role attributes: Report to 
teaching leader, Take course duties and student administration. Because the course leader 
is supervisor of the course lecturer, if necessary, the teaching leader can inherit the role of 
the course lecturer. As a concern of the teaching leader’ workload or duty assignment, the 
teaching leader can only inherit a part of duty of the course lecturer. For an example, the 
teaching leader can only take the load of student administration from the course lecturer. 
We can set the attribute of student administration as ObA and set two other attributes, 
report to the head and take course duties, as HA. The same mechanism can be applied to 
dean and head of department, head of department and teaching leader. Through ObA and 
HA, we can have a partial heritance for hierarchical roles. So far to the best of our 
knowledge none literatures contribute to the partial heritance in RBAC research. If all the 
attributes of a role are ObA, any inheritance will accept all attributes of the role. If the 
attributes of a role are HA, any these attributes are not inheritable to its descendants. 
Furthermore, well-defined HA can be used to keep the privacy of a role. 
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 Head of Department 
Report to the Dean 
Manage department 
Supervise leaders
Figure 3 A part of a college leadership hierarchy 
Dean 
Head of Department  Head of Department 
Research 
Leader 
Teaching 
Leader 
Research 
Leader  
Teaching 
Leader 
Project 
Researcher
Course 
Lecturer 
Report to president 
Supervise head of department
Report to the head 
Manage courses 
Supervise lecturers 
Report to teaching leader 
Take course duties  
Student administration 
 
  
 
 
4.3 Attributes Operation 
Because any role consists of its attributes, each attribute can be assigned to different 
types. In order to effectively use the role attributes to extend current RBAC, it is essential 
to have fundamental operations on the attributes.  These basic operations include “add an 
attribute”, “delete an attribute”, “update an attribute”, “suspend an attribute”, and 
“change the type of an attribute”. 
 
4.3.1ADD 
As a role consists of a set of attributes, any system needs a function to add an attribute 
into an existing role if it is needed. Now we define the operation of ADD for an attribute. 
                             
ADDattribute (Attr: r) 
If Attr∉r & Attr ATTR∈  
Then r=r {Attr} U
 
 
4.3.2 DELETE 
With the time going, some systems need a function to remove an attribute from an 
existing role if it is needed. Now we define the operation of DELETE for an attribute. 
 
DELETEattribute(Attr:r) 
If Attr r∈ & Attr ATTR∈  
Then r=r\{Attr} 
 
4.3.3 UPDATE 
When a role is defined with its attributes by the system, after a while, some attributes 
of the role need updates from time to time. This requires a function to operate on the 
attributes to update any attributes which need changes. The UPDATE operation is 
defined as the follows. 
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UPDATEattribute(Attr:r) 
If Attr r∈ & Attr ATTR∈ & New Attr≠ Attr 
Then r=r\{Attr} & Attr=New Attr 
                                                      Then r=r {Attr} U
 
4.3.4 SUSPEND 
Some attributes of a role can be no use for a time period. After a certain time, those 
attributes should have previous function. For an example, an attribute is assigned to 
check the log of DBMS. If DMBS needs maintenance for several days, during the period, 
this attribute does not need work. It is not necessary to delete this attribute. Here we 
introduce an operation, SUSPEND. It is defined as the follows. 
 
SUSPENDattribute(Attr:r) 
If Attr r∈ & Attr ATTR∈  
While Attr unavailable Then r=r\{Attr} 
                                          Else r=r {Attr} U
 
 
4.3.5 TPYE-CHANGE 
As we discussed previously, there are four different types of attributes, CA, OA, ObA, 
and HA. At different scenarios, the same attribute might need a different type to match 
the required function of a role. In order to make that happen effectively, we need an 
operation, TPYE-CHANGE, as the follows. 
 
TYPE-CHANGE(Attr.type:r) 
If Attr r∈ & Attr ATTR∈  
If Attr.type≠ requested type 
  Then Attr.type=requested type 
 
5 Attributes and Object, Users, Permissions and Roles 
The attributes become the extended feature of RBAC. Traditional RBAC needs a new 
consideration of its mechanism. The core BBAC has a categorization and definition of 
role, user, permission, and object. There are many literatures about the co-relationships of 
these four entities [more references here]. We do not address more over these traditional 
relationships here. Because the attributes are very important components of any role, it is 
necessary to redraw the co-relationships of attribute and role, attribute and user, attribute 
and object.   
 
  5.1 Attributes and Roles 
Any role consists of its attributes. While a role is assigned and defined in a system, 
automatically a series of attributes are bound to the role. Any attributes of a role will be 
set in two different types according to their requirements. 
 
Rr∈  
ATTRATTRR ×⊆ }2{.}1{. TtypeAttrTtpyeAttr ××  
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},{2};,{1 HAObATOACAT ==  
 
Through this extension, any roles in RBAC systems have their own attributes which can 
be assigned into suitable types. Through this improvement, the role has much more 
flexibility and operability by using the attributes. 
 
 
   5.2 Attributes and Users 
The attributes have no direct relationships with users. All the functions of attributes have 
to be embedded in a role or roles.  
 
 
 
RUsers×
A user can have one or many roles. A role can be assigned to one or many users. Users 
never concern the attributes of a role. 
 
   5.3 Attributes and Permissions 
Traditional RBAC has a direct relationship between roles and permissions. Usually 
means a many-to-many mapping permission-to-role assignment. 
Now we have a series of attributes to represent a role. It is useful to combine the 
attributes directly with the permissions. When an operation on the attributes is done, the 
role function has some changes accordingly. If the attributes are directly combined with 
permissions, any operation on attributes will be reflected back to permission changes. 
That makes permission-to-role assignment much more dynamic and applicable.  
RolessPermission ×
 
AP   a many-to-many mapping permission-to-attribute AttributessPermission ×⊆
 
In order to simplify the management operation, none of any permission or any 
combination of permissions is allowed to be assigned to an attribute of any role more 
than once. This can ensure that any different attributes of a role have a different 
permission or permission combination. It is obvious that an operation on attributes will 
automatically reflect the permission change to a role. For example, an attribute of a role 
is assigned to look after an FTP server. Actually the permission to operate on the FTP 
server is combined with this attribute. If a DELETE operation is executed on this 
attribute, it means the permission to operate on the FTP server is removed from the role 
as the attribute is deleted. In the same way, an ADD operation on a role leads to the role 
having an extra permission or its combination as an attribute is added in. An UPDATE on 
an attribute leads to update the permission associated with the updated attribute. A 
SUSPEND operation on an attribute leads to temporarily stop a related permission or its 
combination. A TYPE-CHANGE operation on an attribute affects related permission or 
its combination as compulsory or optional, obvious or hidden to a role. It is obvious that 
any operation on the attributes directly impacts on the function of a role and its associated 
permission or combinations.  
 
   5.4 Attributes and Objects 
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 The attributes do not have directly relationship with objects. Any interactions between 
attributes and objects have to pass the bridge of a role like the following.  
 
ObjectsRolesAttributes →→→→  
 
Also objects can be directly mapped onto permissions or their combinations, users, as 
well as roles.    
 
 
6 Attributes and ANSI RBAC Framework 
The role is a fundamental component of RBAC. We have introduced the attributes for the 
roles and all the components of RBAC are impacted by the attributes in a different 
degree. It is important to discuss how the attributes impact ANSI RBAC framework.  
Figure 4 shows the ANSI RBAC framework. 
 
Figure 4 ANSI RBAC Framework 
 
Core RBAC 
Hierarchical 
RBAC 
Constrained 
RBAC 
ANSI RBAC 
General Limited DSD SSD 
 
 
 6.1 Attributes and Core RBAC 
Table 1 shows the fundamental difference between ANSI Core RBAC and Attribute-
extended core RBAC. 
 ANSI Core RBAC Attribute-extended Core RBAC 
Entities Users 
Roles 
Permissions 
Users 
Roles 
Permissions  
Attributes 
Relationships ROLESUSERS ×  
SPERMISSIONROLES ×  
ROLESUSERS ×  
ATTRIBUTESROLES ×  
SPERMISSIONATTRIBUTES ×  
Operations 
on entities 
AddUser 
DeleteUser 
AddUser 
DeleteUser 
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AddRole 
DeleteRole 
AddPermission 
DeletePermission 
AddRole 
DeleteRole 
AddPermission 
DeletePermission 
AddAttribute 
DeleteAttribute 
UpdateAttrbiute 
SuspendAttribute 
Type-ChangeAttribute 
Table 1 ANSI Core RBAC and Attribute-extended Core RBAC 
 
    
 
 
 
 
6.2 Attributes and Hierarchical RBAC 
Table 2 shows the differences of ANSI Hierarchical RBAC and Attribute-extended 
Hierarchical RBAC.  
 ANSI Hierarchical RBAC Attribute-extended Hierarchical 
RBAC 
General Role 
Hierarchies 
and Limited 
Role 
Hierarchies 
RolesRoles × is irreflexive and 
acycle 
A partial order is reflexive and 
transitive closure of 
 RolesRoles ×
 
No difference as ANSI 
Hierarchical RBAC  
User 
Inheritance 
Any User gets a role and also 
get this role’s parental 
authorities 
Any User gets a role and gets only 
ObAs of its parents.   
Permission 
Inheritance 
A role r is authorized for all 
permissions for what r’ is 
authorized where r inherits r’ 
Only ObAs of r’ are inheritable. 
HAs of r’ are not inheritable. 
Activation 
Inheritance 
Activating a role r 
automatically activates another 
role r’ where r inherits r’ 
Only ObAs of r’ will have active 
functions. HAs have non-function 
to r. 
Role Privacy 
on Hierarchies 
If there is an inheritance from 
r’ to r,  r’ has no privacy to r. 
If there is an inheritance from r’ 
to r, r’ has its privacy to r if r’ has 
some HAs. 
Table 2 Comparison between ANSI Hierarchical RBAC and Attribute-extended 
Hierarchical RBAC 
 
    
6.3 Attributes and Constrained RBAC 
   Table 3 shows the comparison between ANSI Constrained RBAC and Attribute-
extended Constrained RBAC. 
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 ANSI Constrained RBAC Attribute-extended Constrained 
RBAC 
Static 
Constraint 
This constraint limits the roles 
which can be assigned to a 
user.   
For this constraint at the role 
level, it is the same. But a further 
level about attributes needs further 
exploring and defining. To our 
best knowledge, there is no further 
research on this aspect. We will 
do more work on that later. 
Dynamic 
Constraints 
This constraint limits the roles 
which a user can activate in a 
session. 
Similarly here a further level of 
attributes needs exploring and 
defining. So far there is no 
literature about this extension. We 
will do more work on that in the 
future 
Table 3 Differences between ANSI Constrained RBAC and Attribute-extended 
Constrained RBAC 
 
 
 
7 New RBAC Framework with Attributes 
Figure 5 shows the relationships between the attributes and ANSI framework. The 
attributes have extended the functions of the role. The core RBAC, hierarchical BAAC 
and constrained RBAC are all impacted by the attributes. More details have been 
discussed in previous sections.  
 
Figure 5 Attribute-extended RBAC Framework 
Core RBAC 
Hierarchical 
RBAC 
Constrained 
RBAC 
 
Attributes 
RBAC 
 
 
8 Conclusion Remarks and Future Works 
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We have worked out a new entity, attribute, for ANSI RBAC. The attributes significantly 
extend the function of the roles in a system into a new level. The attributes have extended 
the operations, definitions and transactions in all three components of ANSI RBAC, 
namely core RBAC, hierarchical RBAC, and constrained RBAC. The flexibility and 
privacy of a role can be effectively implemented by different attribute types. This paper 
has a significant new idea to contribute the ANSI RBAC framework by adapting the 
attributes. More impact evaluation is needed to be done to the attributes in the future. 
More research will be carried out on the relationships and transactions between the 
attributes and hierarchical RBAC as well as constrained RBAC.    
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